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PHASE THREE OF NEW YORK STATE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LAW: THE FINANCIAL AFTERMATH

BY JENNIFER SARKEES

*PLEASE NOTE: Throughout this article, I have referred
to batterers with masculine pronouns and victims with feminine
ones. This is simply due to the fact that the majority of domestic
violence cases in New York State, well over 80%, reflect such
roles.' It was in no way meant to detract from the fact that there are
female abusers and male victims, or that domestic violence exists
between same-sex partners.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the last several decades, due to a limited
understanding of its full impact, there has been a very gradual
recognition and, in turn, a very gradual reaction to domestic
violence in the state of New York. The impacts of domestic
violence proved greater and more broad-reaching than originally
perceived and, in turn, led to the realization of additional issues to
which the initial responses were insufficient. Thus, as new issues
developed, new responses to domestic violence have also
developed, resulting in what amounts to three phases of law
reform.
I will address Phases One and Two briefly before focusing
in some detail on Phase Three. Phase One includes the history of
domestic violence recognition and criminalization and the limited
scope of initial responses to domestic violence before its full
impact was realized. Phase Two includes some of the currently
recognized issues of domestic violence that have been addressed;

Domestic Violence Data Sheet, N.Y.S. OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
February
14,
2003,
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/aboutdv/dataweb2003.html.
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however, the law enacted as part of the law reform in response to
these issues remains inadequate. In addition, Phase Two includes
suggested improvements for the existing law reform. Phase Three
will identify and discuss the currently unaddressed issues with
respect to the financial aftermath of domestic violence faced by the
victims of domestic violence and their children once they leave the
violent situation. In addition, Phase Three will also provide
proposed suggestions for new law reform to address these financial
issues. Up until now, the main focus of domestic violence law has
been on stopping ongoing abuse, preventing further abuse and
removing victims and children from abusive situations. However,
what has not been addressed is that once victims and their children
are finally removed, they have a whole new set of obstacles to
overcome so as not to feel compelled to return to their abusers.
First, victims and their children need continued protection from
their abusers even after they have left. Second, victims need the
financial support necessary to obtain permanent housing. Finally,
victims need the emotional support, counseling and training
necessary to become independent, employable and self-supporting.
In order to achieve these goals, Phase Three focuses on the
necessary reform within the following five areas of the law: (1)
Welfare Law; (2) Equitable Distribution Law; (3) Intestacy Law;
(4) Bankruptcy Law; and (5) Taxation Law.
PHASE ONE: THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RECOGNITION AND REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE

Due to a gross lack of education and information as well as
a patriarchal societal mindset, domestic violence was not always
viewed as a crime by police officers, lawyers, or judges. For
decades, this type of abuse was seen as the husband's right; a way
to keep his wife in line. It was not uncommon, or even unsettling,
for incidents of victims being blamed for the domestic violence,
and these occurrences of domestic violence were rarely, if ever,
treated as violent crimes. In addition, the courts did not treat
incidents of domestic or family violence as criminal offenses
because doing so was seen as the equivalent of violating a family's
privacy rights. Thus, the primary jurisdiction of such offenses was
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within Family Court.2 The courts have often justified domestic
violence as the batterer's reaction to the victim's provocations,
stating that had the victim not done this or that, the batterer would
never have injured or even killed her.
Prior to the late 1970s, police officers would typically
respond to domestic or family violence calls with a "separation and
mediation" approach.3 Instead of making an arrest, the intention of
the responding officer was to separate the batterer from the victim
and to attempt to mediate or settle the dispute.4 The goal of the
officer was neither to remove the batterer from "his own home"
nor to arrest the batterer. In fact, a common approach was to have
the batterer go for a walk or a drive and return home after having
had a chance to "cool off." Eventually, this caused domestic
violence victims to begin suing police departments in the mid1970s for failing to act on their behalf and provide them with
adequate protection.' In the late 1970s Article 8 of the Family
Court Act finally allowed victims of domestic violence to seek
relief in either Family Court or Criminal Court. Furthermore, the
"72-hour rule" provided victims with 72 hours in which to make
their decision. However, despite the fact that the United States
Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic Violence published a
report in 1984 stating that arrest was the preferred response to
incidents of domestic violence, New York State did not begin
considering adopting "pro-arrest" policies until 1994.6
One of the most abhorrent shortcomings of the prior
treatment of domestic violence was its failure to protect the
children involved. It used to be that children who were exposed to
domestic violence were rarely, if ever, factored into the equation
when it came to divorce and/or custody proceedings between the
victim and the batterer. Courts did not want to deprive parents of
their rights and often viewed one spouse's violent acts toward the
2

Obtaining and Enforcing Valid Orders of Protection in New York State 9,

available
http://www.usdoi.pov/usao/n3w/victim witness/pdf/OOPmanual.pdf.
'Id. at 10.
4id.
5id,
6id.

at
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other as something totally separate from their abilities as a parent;
as if the children had no knowledge of or ill-effects from
witnessing one parent repeatedly abuse the other. In 1996, judges
in New York were finally required by section 240 of the Domestic
Relations Law (DRL) to "consider" domestic violence in
determining custody and visitation.' Eventually, legislation was
passed prohibiting custody or visitation for a parent convicted of
first or second degree murder of the other parent, but even that had
exceptions.8
PHASE

Two: CURRENTLY RECOGNIZED ISSUES THAT STILL
LACK ADEQUATE REFORM

New York is generally one of the last, if not the last State to
enact adequate laws regarding domestic violence. It was not until
the 1990s that New York State began to respond more
appropriately to domestic violence. Eventually, even the courts
came around in terms of viewing domestic violence as a violent
crime. Currently, there are several effective laws and methods in
place within New York State to protect victims of domestic
violence. These include the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) of 1994; the New York State Family Violence and
Protection Act of 1994 and the Act's mandatory arrest provision in
1996; "no-drop" prosecution policies; evidence-based prosecution;
and the state-wide expansion of Integrated Domestic Violence
(IDV) Courts in 2002. However, despite the many advances that
have taken place, New York still has a long way to go.
7 Commission

on Domestic Violence Fatalities: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Children,available at
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/publications/fatality/part7.html (1997).
8 Act of July 7, 1998, ch. 150, §2, 1998 N.Y. Laws note (codified as
amended at
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1-c(a)) (McKinney 1998). (240.1-c.(a) provides
that "1-c. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary,
no court shall make an order providing for visitation or custody to a person who
has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree in this state, or
convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this state,
would constitute either murder in the first or second degree, of a parent, legal
custodian, legal guardian, sibling, half-sibling or step-sibling of any child who is
the subject of the proceeding..."
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New York currently lacks a specific domestic violence
statute. Instead, domestic violence is addressed in certain sections
of the Penal Law, Article 8 of the Family Court Act and DRL §
240. New York must strive to adopt one concise statute that
addresses the now realized myriad of domestic violence issues and
follows them up with required and appropriate responses at all
levels (i.e., police response, victim and child removal and
protection, judicial response, abuser accountability, etc.). Even if
this new statute refers to other New York statutes currently in
existence (such as the Penal Law), it will still eliminate the
piecemeal legislation in New York and prevent discretionary
and/or uninformed judgment from being the primary determinant
of the safety and future of victims and children.
Despite the efforts of VAWA, which provided funding for
judicial training programs, there are still a lot of judges and
attorneys who lack the information necessary to properly handle
domestic violence issues.9 When this happens, victims and children
are deprived of even the limited benefit that the current New York
Domestic Relations Law § 240(1)(a) - that judges "consider"
domestic violence in custody and visitation cases' - is designed to
afford them. Judges often order anger management classes as a
condition for an abuser's probation. That many judges fail to
understand the difference between an "angry person" and a
"batterer" results in methods that are ineffective in either educating
the abuser or protecting the victim. To make matters worse, judges
often grant adjournments in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) to
first-time offenders. If the abuser meets the requirements of the
ACD, the crime is expunged. Thus, upon a subsequent conviction,
there will be no evidence of a prior record, which will likely result
in inadequate disciplinary action.
Misinformed attorneys can do just as much harm as
misinformed judges. An attorney who is unaware of or who fails to
recognize the effects of domestic violence on both the victim and
9 Lynne R. Kurtz, "Comment" should not be italicized pursuant to Rule 16.1
second to last sample Comment: ProtectingNew York's Children: An Argument
for the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse
Abuser
Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1345, 1361 (1997).
0
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(a).
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the child may fail to introduce evidence of the abuse at a custody
proceeding,"' thereby canceling out the statutory requirement that
the judge consider domestic violence as a factor in the
determination. 2 Even attorneys who are aware that domestic
violence is an issue may advise their client to accept a settlement in
not to introduce evidence of domestic
exchange for promising
13
violence to the court.
New York must enact legislation that requires law schools
to discuss domestic violence in all areas of legal study and inform
students on how to recognize and address it. Typically, domestic
violence is addressed only in "family law" classes. However,
certain classes within some family law concentrations (such as
Estate Planning, Wills and Trusts, etc.) do not address domestic
violence at all. Thus, it is highly likely that many law students,
including those who take "family law" classes, will graduate from
law school without ever having learned about the severity of
domestic violence or how to address it. As a result, it is just as
likely that these uninformed students will unwittingly encounter
numerous clients who are victims of domestic violence without
being capable of recognizing it much less effectively addressing it.
If more law school classes addressed domestic violence, it would
help to ensure that students who become lawyers and judges will
not be hesitant to address domestic violence issues and will be
competent to do so.14
Moreover, New York must require mandatory periodic
judicial instruction and continuing legal education regarding
domestic violence in order to keep all members of the legal
community apprised of the various impacts of domestic violence
" Lynne R. Kurtz, Comment: ProtectingNew York's Children: An Argument for
the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser
Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1345, 1363 (1997) [hereinafter Kurtz,
ProtectingNew York's Children].
12 Hon. Judith J. Gische, Essay: Domestic Violence as a Factor in Custody
Determinations in New York State, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 937, 939 (2000).
13Kurtz, ProtectingNew York's Children,supra note 10, at 1363.
14 Judy Perry Martinez, Making a Difference: Some Thoughts on Community
Collaboration and Individual Effort, 7 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 55, 55

(Apr./May 2002).
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and how to effectively address it. This type of instruction would
lead to more effective legal representation and better informed
judicial decisions in cases where domestic violence is involved;
and thus, prevent victims from being advised not to disclose
domestic violence and inhibiting abusers from obtaining ACDs and
a chance at a clean record.
In addition to the above-mentioned issues, there are several
other aspects of domestic violence that have been identified, yet
inadequately addressed, by New York State. For instance, in 1998,
it was proposed that no custody or visitation be granted to a parent
convicted of first or second degree murder or first degree
manslaughter of the other parent.15 In 2002, it was proposed that
there be a presumption that no custody or visitation be granted to a
parent who committed an act of domestic violence on the other
parent. 6 Several states have adopted this presumption; however,
New York has not.'7 Finally, in 2003 it was proposed that parents
or guardians who had committed certain homicidal offenses
against the other parent be prevented from having custody or
visitation. 8 Not only has New York State declined to adopt any of
these broad-reaching, stringent proposals, it has chosen to enact
laws that are inadequate instead.
The aforementioned DRL § 240(1)(a) requiring judges to
merely "consider" domestic violence in determining custody and
visitation does not go far enough to protect victims of domestic
violence and their children.19 It lacks specificity in that it fails to
state how much weight judges should give domestic violence,
leaving it to the trial courts' discretion.2 ° Unfortunately, it is still
15 A 9733, 1998 Assem., 22 1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y.).
16 S 5624, 2002 Sen., 225th Reg. Sess. (N.Y.).
17 Lynne R. Kurtz, Comment: ProtectingNew York's Children:An Argument for
the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser
Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1345, 1350 (1997).
18 S 4194, 2003 Sen., 226th Reg. Sess. (N.Y.); A 7395, 2003 Assem., 226th Reg.
Sess. (N.Y.).
19 The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children, Commission on Domestic
Violence
Fatalities
(Oct.
1997),
available
at
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/publications/fatality/part7.html.
20 Kurtz, ProtectingNew York's Children, supranote 10, at 1357.
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often the case that attorneys and judges are undereducated about
domestic violence; thus, the current New York statutes that do
address domestic violence often fall short of protecting the victims
and children who are dealing with it. 2' New York must modify

DRL § 240(l)(a) to reflect the legislation proposed in 2002. If so
modified, New York would join the over 40 states that have
adopted the domestic violence Commission's recommendation
from 1997 - that the following two rebuttable presumptions be
adopted regarding custody and visitation of children in domestic
violence cases: (1) that sole or joint custody of a child not be
granted to a perpetrator of domestic violence; and (2) that
visitation, if granted at all, be supervised.22 However, where the
abuser is granted supervised visitation rights, New York must also
enact legislation to protect the victim from exposure to further
abuse, via away-from-home drop-off and pick-up provisions and/or
supervised or no-contact drop-off and pick-up provisions.
Another inadequacy within New York's DRL appears in §
240.1-c(a), which deprives a parent convicted of first or second
degree murder of the other parent custody or visitation rights
"unless the child, being of the appropriate age to assent to custody
or visitation, does so and the court finds that it is in the child's best
interest.,23 DRL § 240.1-c(a) must be relieved of this exception.
Instead, a parent so convicted should absolutely be denied custody
and visitation with the only exception being for victims of
domestic violence who killed their abusers in self-defense.
Despite the inadequacy of some of the existing reform,
there is no question that domestic violence laws in New York State
have come a long way in the past several decades. However, there
seems to be no logical reason why New York is so hesitant to go a
step further in so many areas - especially in areas, such as custody
and visitation, that have been urged by the Legislature and already
expanded upon in other states. Although New York has made
many advancements in domestic violence law, these advancements
21
22

Id. at 1361.
Summary of Findings and Recommendations, Commission on Domestic

Violence
Fatalities
(Oct.
1997),
available
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/publications/fatality/part4.html.
23
N.Y.DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1-c(a) (McKinney 1998).

at
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have virtually no bearing on the victims who, for a number of
reasons, do not use them. In particular, there is a severe lack of
legal and financial assistance available to indigent and low-income
victims as well as victims whose spouses control the family's
finances. Even when these victims finally gain the courage
necessary to leave an abusive situation, where can they go?
Without little money to support themselves and their children let
alone pay legal fees, what can they do? The answer is nothing,
which is exactly what most of these victims are forced to do. This
brings us to Phase Three of New York State domestic violence
law, which identifies and addresses the financial problems facing
victims and their children once they leave an abusive situation.
PHASE THREE: NEW AREAS IN NEED OF RECOGNITION - THE
FINANCIAL AFTERMATH

WELFARE LAW

I have included welfare reform as the first "new" area
simply because it is the key to reforming most of the other issues
in this section. Domestic violence victims' needs from the welfare
system greatly differ from the needs of non-victims. 24 They
25
include: (1) continued access to benefits and specialized services
to recover from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in order to
become self-supporting;26 (2) protection from abusers during this
process; 27 (3) affordable permanent housing; 2 (4) new teaching

Joan Zorza, Women, Welfare, Work and Battering, 2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REP. 4, 4, 15 (Oct./Nov. 1996) [hereinafter Zorza, Women, Welfare, Work and
24

Battering].
25 Anne L. Perry & Joan Zorza, Bread and Butter Issues for Survivors of
Domestic Violence: Income, Employment and Housing, 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

REP. 7, 7-8 (Oct./Nov. 1999) [hereinafter Perry & Zorza, Bread and Butter
Issues for Survivors of Domestic Violence].
26 Id.
27 Zorza, Women, Welfare, Work and Battering,supra note 23 at 15.
28 Perry & Zorza, Bread and Butter Issues for Survivors of Domestic Violence,
supra note 24 at 7-8.
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techniques to help them concentrate and "learn to learn; 29 and (5)
a job market that meets their particular needs3" (i.e., one that will
not fire a victim or hold her responsible for the abuser's disruptive
acts).
In 1998, New York adopted the Federal Family Violence
Option (FVO), intended to allow states to address the safety needs
of domestic violence victims and their children within the state
welfare plans. 3' However, statistics show that it is not being
properly implemented in New York, resulting in very few victims
receiving the available waivers that FVO is intended to grant in
order to help victims escape domestic violence.32 This impropriety
is attributed to various things such as the following: counties
ignoring New York's directives addressing the specifics of FVO
and the roles of domestic violence liaisons; advocates failing to
adequately communicate with clients; victims being ashamed to
admit domestic violence to a stranger and unsure about
confidentiality; domestic violence screening forms being buried in
the lengthy application never to be seen by victims; and advocates
failing to coordinate with domestic violence liaisons.33
Because of the particularized needs of victims within the
welfare system, domestic violence must be an exception to the
five-year time limit on Clinton's Welfare-to-work program.
Services must be provided to assist victims with PTSD, current
abuse, "learning to learn," and securing permanent housing. New
York must insure that every county is properly implementing FVO
by ensuring the following: that safeguards exist for proper
implementation; that advocates ask clients if they have been
screened for domestic violence and advise them that they can be
screened at any time; that applicants receive the screening form
Zorza, Women, Welfare, Work and Battering, supra note 23 at 15.
Perry & Zorza, Bread and Butter Issues for Survivors of Domestic Violence,
supra note 24 at 7-8.
31 Jennifer L. DeCarli, Statistics on New York's Family Violence Option Reflect
Poor Implementation, Greater Upstate Law Project, Inc., available at
http://www.empirejustice.org/IssueArea/DomesticViolence/PublicBenefits/Stats
NYFamViolenceOption2001 .htm.
29
30

32

Id,

33Id.
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separately from the rest of the application and are instructed as to
the form's purpose; and that districts screen all applicants and recertifications for domestic violence face-to-face.34
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW

In terms of divorce, New York is currently a "fault" state,
meaning that in order to obtain a divorce, the spouse filing must
show fault (in the form of at least one of six grounds listed under
DRL § 170) on the part of the other spouse.35 Despite a big push
toward making it a "no-fault" state, New York remains a fault
divorce state for the time being. However, although New York is a
fault state regarding divorce, it is a no-fault state regarding the
distribution of assets pursuant to a divorce. In other words, a
spouse will be required to show fault in order to obtain a divorce in
New York. However, the evidence of such fault - or of marital
misconduct such as domestic violence - shall generally have no
bearing whatsoever on the distribution of assets or an award of
compensation in favor of the victim spouse 6 unless the court
chooses to take marital fault into consideration pursuant to the
statute's catchall provision (DRL § 236(B)(5)(d)(13)), which
allows consideration of "any other factor" which may be "just and
proper., 37 Moreover, marital fault is only to be taken into
consideration under DRL § 236(B)(5)(d)(13) where "the marital
misconduct is so egregious or uncivilized as to bespeak of a blatant
disregard of the marital relationship - misconduct that "shocks the
conscience" of the court thereby compelling it to invoke its
equitable power to do justice between the parties.""
In most situations, however, New York does not consider
marital fault when determining equitable distribution, which is the
division of all marital property (property acquired during the
marriage, regardless of whose name it's in) in a divorce
34 Id.
35 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1998).
36
Havell v. Islam, 301 A.D.2d 339, 344,449,452 (N.Y.A.D.Ist Dept. 2002).
37 Id. at 344, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 452, citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(5)(d)(13) (McKinney 2003).
38 Id. at 344, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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proceeding.39 It is important to note that equitable distribution does
not mean equal distribution. DRL § 236(B), the equitable
distribution law, generally does not apply in any action unless the
marriage is actually terminated (i.e., a divorce). 40 Thus, if the
victim dies while married to the abuser, regardless of how she dies,
and the court does not allow domestic violence to trump the
equitable distribution law, the abuser keeps everything. This is
because there is no divorce to trigger DRL § 236(B) and, in turn, to
entitle the victim's estate to her portion of the marital assets.
Moreover, where the victim survives and a divorce ensues, fault is
generally not to be considered in the court's determination of
equitable distribution.4 1 However, in Havell v. Islam,4 2 the court
did take domestic violence into account when it granted the victim
over 95% of all marital assets.43 Here, the abuser beat the victim
severely with a barbell 44 - a "vicious assault" that was "so
egregious as to shock the [judicial] conscience., 45 However, this
case is extreme. To what extent must the victim be abused in order
for it to be egregious enough to shock the judicial conscience so as
to provoke the court to consider fault pursuant to New York's
DRL?
Despite arguments to the contrary, fault should play a role
in post-divorce finances such as the distribution of assets, the
award of maintenance and the determination of compensation
pursuant to divorce cases involving domestic violence.46
Opponents of this notion fear that the "narratives" required from
the divorcing parties in order to assess fault will ultimately lead to
exaggerated, inflamed depictions of marriages that are far worse

39

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B (McKinney 2003).

40ld.
41 id.

301 A.D.2d 339, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1st Dept. 2002).
Id.at 348, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
"Id.
at 341, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
45
1 d.at 343, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
46 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Symposium on Divorce and Feminist
Legal
Theory: Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era,
82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2529-30 (1994).
42

43
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than what the marriages are like in reality.47 However, a fault-blind
approach to domestic violence adversely affects victims when it
comes to property and financial distribution by failing to provide
them with affirmative protection.48 Such an approach also sends
the message that only damage to tangible property counts, while
emotional damage does not, even when done recklessly and
intentionally.49
Courts must allow domestic violence to take precedence
over equitable distribution law. This will ensure that if the victim
dies during the marriage, regardless of whether or not the abusive
spouse killed her, her estate will be entitled to her equitable share
of the marital assets. It will also prevent the abuser from retaining
all marital assets due to the non-occurrence of a divorce, which
generally triggers equitable distribution. This is especially
important where the abusive spouse does kill the victim. Here, the
abuser, in preventing the occurrence of a divorce by killing the
victim, will potentially be rewarded for his wrongdoing by
avoiding equitable distribution and keeping all marital assets.
Once courts allow domestic violence to take precedence over
equitable distribution, then the victim's equitable share of any
property should go to one of three places: (1) her adult children, if
any; and/or (2) in trust for her minor children, if any, with the
trustee being someone other than the abuser or anyone without an
adverse interest to the abuser; or (3) if there are no children, to her
estate, where it can be distributed accordingly to the members of
her family (parents, siblings, etc.).
In addition, although the general rule in New York is that
marital fault is not to be considered in determining equitable
distribution, New York must allow domestic violence, regardless
of its severity, to be the exception to this rule. Then - once
domestic violence has been established - based on the duration of
the marriage and the degree and duration of domestic violence
throughout the marriage, the victim should get a portion of the
assets over and above her equitable share. In many cases, this will
47

1Id. at

48
49

2547.

Id. at 2530-31.
Id. at. 2567.
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aid victims in obtaining the financial means necessary to support
themselves and their children while seeking the requisite services
to recover from PTSD and secure permanent housing until they are
able to be self-supporting. In addition, this will ensure that, to the
extent possible, the abusers will pay for the victims' counseling
and housing until the victims are self-supporting; thus, allowing
New York State to allocate more funding to indigent victims.
INTESTACY RIGHTS

Intestacy rights are the rights of a spouse or relative of a
decedent to take a share of the decedent's estate if the decedent
dies intestate (i.e., without a will). Generally, the surviving spouse
is the first person - and the only non-blood, non-adoptive relative provided for under New York's Estates, Powers & Trusts Law
(EPTL) if the decedent spouse dies intestate.50 However, if a victim
kills her abusive spouse, she may be left without intestacy rights.
According to Riggs v. Palmer,5 by law, "one cannot take property
by inheritance or will from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has
murdered." 2 However, a wrongdoer may acquire property from his
victim if the slayer was insane at the time of the commission of his
act, if the killing was accidental or in self-defense, or if the
wrongdoer is negligent or guilty of "minor manslaughter."53 But,
what if the victim cannot prove insanity, accident or self-defense?
What if she is found guilty of more than "minor manslaughter"?
She stands to lose all intestacy rights in these cases.
A major factor in the victim's loss of intestacy rights is the
existence of what is called a joint tenancy. A joint tenancy is a
form of ownership between two or more people (such as a husband
and wife). Each joint tenant has a "right of survivorship" that, upon
the death of one of the joint tenants, automatically passes the
deceased joint tenant's title to the surviving joint tenant(s). It is
important to note that the decedent joint tenant's share of the
50

N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2004).
51Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, (1889).
52

1d. at 513.
3In re Wells' Will, 76 Misc. 2d 458, 462, 350 N.Y.S.2d 114, 119 (1973).
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property does not go to the decedent's heirs or to the relatives or
persons named in the decedent's will. However, a joint tenancy
may be terminated by any of the joint tenants, even against the
wishes of the other joint tenant(s). This automatically converts the
joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, which has no right of
survivorship.
Consistent with Civil Rights Law § 79-b, a victim who kills
her abusive spouse does not forfeit her own vested interested in
one-half of the joint tenancy because allowing her to keep it does
not afford her any benefit from her "wrongdoing" (it was already
hers before the wrongdoing occurred).54 However, upon killing the
abusive spouse in self-defense, any property held in joint tenancy
by the victim and the abusive spouse will revert to a tenancy in
common; thus, destroying the victim's right of survivorship to the
decedent spouse's share of that property. This is because Riggs
prevents the victim from succeeding to the survivorship interest
that would ordinarily arise upon the death of her joint tenant and
from allowing her to benefit from her "wrongdoing."
Moreover, as In Matter of Covert5 establishes, Civil Rights
Law § 79-b cuts both ways. If the abusive spouse kills the victim,
he will not have to forfeit any of his existing interest in any real or
personal property held in joint tenancy either. For instance, if the
abuser and the victim have a "true" joint bank account, which is
generally considered to be a joint tenancy (as opposed to
"convenience" joint bank account, set up solely for the
contributor's convenience, but not considered to be a joint
tenancy), and the abuser kills the victim, there are two
possibilities:5 6 (1) if the abusive spouse is convicted of first or
second degree murder, he is still entitled to all of the money that he
contributed to the account.5 7 The money contributed by the victim
goes to her estate. However, if the abuser is the sole provider and
the only one who contributed to the account, he is entitled to the
entire contents of the account, despite a first or second degree
54
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murder conviction; and (2) if the abusive spouse is not convicted
of first or second degree murder (i.e., a lesser conviction of
manslaughter or no conviction), the abuser is entitled to the entire
contents of the joint account,58 including the victim's contributions.
None of it goes to her estate!
Currently, under EPTL § 4-1.1, a surviving spouse is
entitled to $50,000.00 plus one-half of the residue of any of the
decedent spouse's property that is not disposed of by will.59 In
addition, EPTL § 5-1.1-A entitles a surviving spouse to a "right of
election" whereby the surviving spouse may choose either: (1)
what the decedent spouse devised to him by will; or (2) the
"elective share," which is the greater of $50,000.00 or one-third of
the decedent's estate upon death.6° In other words, if the decedent
spouse executed a will that left an amount less than the elective
share to the surviving spouse, the EPTL allows the survivor to
exercise his right of election and receive his elective share.
Although §§ 4-1.1 and 5-1.1-A are intended to protect surviving
spouses in the event the decedent spouse dies intestate or leaves a
will that unjustifiably disinherits him, the statute could end up
backfiring. Where a victim dies intestate while married to her
abusive spouse, he will be entitled under § 4-1.1 to $50,000.00
plus one-half of the rest of the victim's estate upon her death. In
addition, where a victim dies during the marriage with a will that
either disinherits the abusive spouse completely or leaves him less
than the elective share, and no proof of domestic violence is
presented to the court, the abuser may be deemed unjustifiably
disinherited or inadequately provided for under § 5-1.1-A and thus
entitled to take his elective share of $50,000.00 or one-third of the
victim's estate at death, whichever is greater.
New York must enact a mechanism within the EPTL to
prevent abusive spouses from inheriting from their victims. This
mechanism must apply regardless of whether the abusive spouse
kills the victim via domestic violence or the abusive spouse fails to
kill her and she dies from something totally unrelated to domestic
Id.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2004).
60
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58 See
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2006

PHASE THREE

violence. In the event a victim of domestic violence dies while
married to her abuser, regardless of when or how she dies, the
existence of domestic violence alone should prevent him from
inheriting from her either by will or by intestacy. In order for this
to happen, several changes must be made in New York State. First,
the EPTL must be modified to insure that, upon the victim's death,
the abusive spouse will neither be entitled to his intestacy rights
under EPTL § 4-1.1 nor to his elective share under EPTL § 5-1.1A. Second, victim spouses must be informed about the laws of
intestacy. They must be instructed to either disinherit abusive
spouses via will or get rid of their wills altogether so that the laws
of intestacy kick in. It is important to note that absent the
suggested modifications to §§ 4-1.1 and 5-1.1-A, these options
cannot be effectuated. This is because under § 4-1.1 the abusive
spouse will likely be protected if the victim dies intestate. In
addition, if there is no proof of domestic violence that can be
presented to the court, § 5-1.1-A may not allow the victim to
effectively disinherit the abusive spouse via will without first
showing that the abuser was not unjustifiably disinherited.
BANKRUPTCY LAW

The number of women filing for bankruptcy between 1979
and 1999 increased by 800%6 and that figure is still rising. There
is a powerful connection between economic vulnerability and
domestic violence as victims' economic dependence on their
abusers often provides a significant hurdle to leaving an abusive
relationship.62 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, which passed
the Senate on March 10, 2005 and is expected to become law63 on
October 17, 2 0 0 5 ,4 contains over 100 "gender-neutral"
61
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proposals.65 However, these changes will have the harshest impact
on women attempting to file bankruptcy, especially those who are
heads of households trying to support their children.66 They will
bear the brunt of higher costs, more restrictions and less protection
from creditor abuses.6 7 In addition, although they may not
themselves file for bankruptcy, ex-wives of men who declare
bankruptcy will also bear a heavy burden - their ability to collect
maintenance and child support will be adversely affected.68 The
current bankruptcy system protects women who are trying to
collect court-ordered support; however, the proposed legislation
will undermine this protection.69
Moreover, the abuser can manipulate bankruptcy laws by
destroying the victim's credit and preventing her from being
financially independent; thus, forcing the victim to either file for
bankruptcy or go on welfare in order to support herself and her
children. In addition, the abuser himself may file for bankruptcy
making it difficult for the victim to collect maintenance and child
support. This will be especially true once the new law is passed.
Furthermore, even if the abuser does not destroy the victim's
credit, she may still have to file for bankruptcy after leaving the
abusive spouse if he prevented her from obtaining the skills
necessary to be self-supporting and/or made it impossible for her to
have a job during the marriage.
The argument that filing bankruptcy allows debtors to be
let "off the hook" easily should not be dismissed. There are many
wealthy (and even some not-so-wealthy) debtors who abuse the
system by keeping property and income while eliminating debts
that they are able to repay.7 ° Banks and other creditors estimate
that bankruptcies cost them $40 billion each year and that this
abuse increases the cost of goods and services purchased by other
http://www.buffalonews.com/editoria/20050525/1071178.asp
Epstein, The Rush to File Bankruptcy].
65 Warren, Wat is a Women 's Issue?, supra note 60 at 30.
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Americans. 7 There is no doubt that debtors should be prohibited
from using bankruptcy as a means of eliminating frivolous debt,
especially when the debtor can be given a payment plan on which
he/she is able to repay part or all of the debt over time.
However, where the debtor is a victim of domestic violence
who is filing for bankruptcy as a result of the abuse or the abuser,
certain exceptions must be made. Victims seeking to leave their
abusers must be informed of the bankruptcy laws so they know
what to expect from the start. A victim, especially one with
children, who feels overwhelmed from the abuse and from the
obstacles she must face in leaving her abusive spouse will likely
feel frustrated and possibly return to the abusive relationship if she
keeps encountering new obstacles at each step toward freedom.
Regardless of why victims file for bankruptcy, if the new law takes
effect as scheduled on October 17, 2005,72 New York must ensure
that an exception exists within the new law for victims of domestic
violence. Without such an exception, it will be more difficult for
victims to collect maintenance and child support than it is now.
This is because under the current law, maintenance and child
support are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, while credit card debt
is. 73 Also, under the current law, creditors who would not receive
any money owed may contest the ruling if it is a Chapter 7 case,
but not if it is Chapter B." Currently, a Chapter 13 affords the exspouse the benefit of a trustee to supervise all cases throughout the
repayment period. 75 The trustee communicates regularly with the
applicant and can get a court order to garnish wages if payments,
including maintenance and child support, are missed.7 6 In effect,
the trustee acts as a collection agent for the ex-spouse. 77 Thus,
whenever possible, those owing support should, under the current
law, be required to file for chapter 13 instead of chapter 7
bankruptcy.
71
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There have been conflicting statements about the new law
in terms of maintenance and child support payments. Some say
that under the new law, maintenance and child support will
become the top debts to be repaid once bankruptcy is filed.7 8
Others say the new law will elevate credit card debt to the level of
maintenance and child support,7 9 forcing ex-spouses to compete
with credit card companies charging high interest rates because the
right to contest will be allowed to creditors in chapter 13 filings as
well as chapter 7 filings.80 In the latter situation, the credit card
debt will obviously take precedence over maintenance and child
support, which are not subject to high interest rates. Regardless of
the outcome of the new law, once it is passed, New York must
implement a mechanism to screen applicants who file for
bankruptcy in order to determine if they are victims of domestic
violence and if that is the reason they are filing. If so, they should
be exempted? from any harsher criteria of the new law. In addition,
those who file for bankruptcy while owing maintenance and/or
child support to their victim (or non-victim) ex-spouses should also
be exempt from the new law to the extent that other creditors
interfere with the payment of court-ordered support.
TAXATION LAW

The Internal Revenue Code creates another circumstance
under which an abusive spouse may indebt the victim forcing her
to file for bankruptcy. IRC § 6013(d)(3) says that if a joint federal
income tax return is made, the tax shall be computed on the
aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be
joint and several. 8 In other words, whatever the tax liability, both
spouses are liable for it and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can
go after either or both of them in order to collect it. Thus, if the
abusive spouse merely files a joint tax return where a tax liability
exists, he may have, deliberately or inadvertently, made the victim
liable for the debt. This is particularly detrimental where the
78
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amount owed is greater than either or both spouses can afford to
pay. It is even worse where the debt was incurred primarily by the
abusive spouse, but is at least partly allocable to the victim,
because then she will potentially be required to pay the debt and/or
file for bankruptcy as a result.
However, IRC §§ 6015(b) and (c) may, under certain
circumstances, provide the victim with some relief. Section
6015(b)(2) provides that where several criteria are met, the
innocent spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the
extent such liability is attributable to such understatement 82 (i.e., an
understatement of income for the taxable year). In order to be
relieved of the portion of the debt attributable to the innocent
spouse, she must show the following: (1) a joint return was filed;
(2) on the return there is an understatement of tax that is
attributable to the error of the guilty spouse; (3) that in signing the
return the innocent spouse did not know, and had no reason to
know, that there was such understatement; (4) under the
surrounding facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
innocent spouse liable for the deficiency; and (5) the innocent
spouse elects to seek the benefits of § 6015(b) within two years
after the date the Secretary commences collection activities.83
Moreover, the innocent spouse is only eligible to elect under §
6015(c) if: (1) at the time such election is filed, the innocent
spouse is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the
guilty spouse;8 4 or (2) the innocent spouse was not a member of the
same household as the guilty spouse at any time during the 12month period ending on the date such election is filed.85 However,
if the victim cannot meet the requirements set forth in § 6015, she
may be obligated to pay the tax liability in addition to the other
financial burdens she must bear upon leaving the abusive spouse
creating one more reason why she may have to resort to filing for
bankruptcy.
82
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Because of the fairly small window of opportunity the
innocent spouse has to seek relief under IRC § 6015, it is
imperative that all married taxpayers, whether or not domestic
violence is an issue, are informed of the implications of filing a
joint return. New York State must make known the severity of IRC
§ 6013 as well as the potential relief that may be obtained under §
6015, if sought within the two-year time limit. In addition, New
York must require all attorneys and accountants who prepare and
file joint tax returns to inform their clients (separately if necessary)
about the impact of IRC §§ 6013 and 6015.
Furthermore, in many abusive situations, the abuser not
only controls the victim, he controls the finances as well. As a
result, victims of domestic violence often have no idea how much
money the abusive spouses earn, how much is in their savings
account or how much their property is worth. Thus, if a joint return
is filed, it is unlikely that victim would realize an understatement
or discrepancy within the return. It is also unlikely that, where an
abuser control the victim's exposure to his finances, she would
even be made aware of such a discrepancy within the two-year
time limit. Thus, upon leaving abusive situations, victims must be
made aware of the existence and meaning IRC §§ 6013 and 6015.
In addition, victims must be screened to determine if, to their
knowledge, their spouses have ever filed a joint tax return and, if
so, when. It must also be determined whether there was a
discrepancy within the return and, if so, whether or not the
Secretary has commenced collection activities. Finally, where a
joint return is filed by spouses between whom domestic violence is
an issue, New York State must allow an extension of the two-year
time limit stated in § 6015(b) so that the victims will have the time
necessary to overcome the many urgencies they will face when
leaving their abusers - such as staying safe, feeding and supporting
themselves and their children, securing permanent housing,
obtaining counseling and finding employment - before they are
forced to deal with their abusers' inaccuracies and falsities on old
joint tax returns.
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CONCLUSION

New York State is definitely progressing with regard to
domestic violence and that should not be diminished. However,
this progress is occurring in baby steps instead of giant leaps. New
York is typically reluctant to pass more protective, more stringent
domestic violence laws, despite the proposal of such laws in our
state and the enacting of them in the majority of other states.
Although slow and steady progress is beneficial in many areas, it is
fatal in the area of domestic violence.
New York's initial response to domestic violence was
based on a limited understanding of its impacts and a lack of
protection from physical abuse. Currently, most, if not all, of New
York's past proposals and existing laws regarding domestic
violence are focused on removing victims and children from
violent situations. This is imperative indeed; however, now that we
see the financial aftermath of domestic violence that faces victims
and children after they leave their abusers, additional reform is
essential. Once the aftermath of domestic violence is addressed,
more victims may be willing to leave their abusers knowing that
they will be able to lead free and independent lives on their own.
For every victim failed by the available laws and resources
in New York State, a lifetime of violence, or perhaps death, awaits
her and her children. For every child failed by these laws and
resources, a future of abuse awaits him or her because the longer a
child's exposure to domestic violence, the greater that child's odds
of becoming a batterer or victim and repeating the vicious cycle. It
is for these people that more funding must be allocated to legal
services for victims. It is for these victims and children that New
York State must heed past proposals and learn from the laws
enacted in so many other states. It is for these people that New
York must modify its current inadequate laws and pass additional
laws where none exist. It is for these people that New York must
address the financial aftermath of domestic violence and ensure
that once victims find the courage and support necessary to leave
their abusers, they will be able to stay away for good and to
support themselves and their children and not be faced with a
future of imprisonment or financial ruin. And it is for these people
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that New York State must act quickly because for many, it will
soon be too late.

